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In an international oligopoly model, we investigate how trade liberalisation impacts on collective 
bargaining outcomes when workers are represented by open shop unions. We find that, with 
intermediate levels of union density, trade liberalisation may lead to higher negotiated wages even if no 
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5.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary 
In spite of the well known potential benefits for aggregate welfare, the labour market effects of trade 
liberalisation appear to have become a major source of anxiety in recent years. In the European Union, for 
example, negative perceptions towards increased globalisation were pointed out as one of the main 
reasons for the recent rejection of the European constitution by French and Dutch voters (Niblett, 2005). 
Additionally, opinion polls undertaken in the older member states point to a rising anti-European attitude, 
reflecting in part concerns that the European Union may be amplifying the threats of globalisation by 
opening borders to cheaper labour and cheaper products from the Eastern neighbours (Dempsey, 2005). 
Within this debate, the spectre that freer trade induces trade unions to engage in a race-to-the-bottom in 
wages is a particular cause of concern. At the same time, perhaps conflicting with the race-to-the-bottom 
argument, collective bargaining institutions continue to be regarded as a major source of downward wage 
rigidity, which will potentially generate macroeconomic imbalances as globalisation proceeds. 
How might we expect trade liberalisation to impact on collective bargaining outcomes? In this paper we 
investigate this question by means of an international duopoly model in which organised labour seeks to 
capture a share of the quasi-rents obtained by its employer. Like most of the existing literature, we model 
the process of integration as a gradual reduction in the per unit cost incurred by each firm when exporting 
to the other country. The main novelty here is that, rather than wages being set unilaterally by monopoly 
unions, they are the outcome of a Nash bargaining process in which the fallback position of the firm 
depends on the level of trade union density. This framework allows us, therefore, to capture an important 
aspect of reality. 
We show that, when union density is less than 100%, trade liberalisation impacts on bargained wages 
through a previously unnoticed mechanism. Harsher international competition (actual or potential) reduces 
the fallback position of the firm in the event of a strike, which serves to help the union in the bargain. In 
other words, a labour dispute at home induces a competitive response from the overseas rival, making the 
conflict more costly to the local firm. For this reason, the firm is willing to sacrifice a larger share of its 
quasi-rents in order to preclude such a dispute. The implications of this mechanism for the impact of trade 
liberalisation on wages are profound: firstly, trade liberalisation may lead to higher bargained wages even 
if no trade exists in equilibrium; secondly, wages need not fall in absolute terms as the economy moves 
from autarky to free trade. 
     
 1 Introduction
In spite of the well known potential bene¯ts for aggregate welfare, the labour market e®ects
of trade liberalisation appear to have become a major source of anxiety in recent years.
In the European Union, for example, negative perceptions towards increased globalisation
were pointed out as one of the main reasons for the recent rejection of the European
constitution by French and Dutch voters (Niblett, 2005). Additionally, opinion polls un-
dertaken in the older member states point to a rising anti-European attitude, re°ecting
in part concerns that the European Union may be amplifying the threats of globalisation
by opening borders to cheaper labour and cheaper products from the Eastern neighbours
(Dempsey, 2005). Within this debate, the spectre that freer trade induces trade unions
to engage in a race-to-the-bottom in wages is a particular cause of concern.1 At the same
time, perhaps con°icting with the race-to-the-bottom argument, collective bargaining in-
stitutions continue to be regarded as a major source of downward wage rigidity, which will
potentially generate macroeconomic imbalances as globalisation proceeds.
How might we expect trade liberalisation to impact on collective bargaining outcomes?
In this paper we investigate this question by means of an international duopoly model
in which organised labour seeks to capture a share of the quasi-rents obtained by its
employer. Like most of the existing literature, we model the process of integration as
a gradual reduction in the per unit cost incurred by each ¯rm when exporting to the
other country. The main novelty here is that, rather than wages being set unilaterally by
monopoly unions, they are the outcome of a Nash bargaining process in which the fallback
position of the ¯rm depends on the level of trade union density. This framework allows
us, therefore, to capture an important aspect of reality: As illustrated in Figure 1, trade
union density varies considerably across countries, and is typically lower than collective
bargaining coverage.2
We show that, when union density is less than 100%, trade liberalisation impacts
on bargained wages through a previously unnoticed mechanism. Harsher international
competition (actual or potential) reduces the fallback position of the ¯rm in the event of
a strike, which serves to help the union in the bargain. In other words, a labour dispute
1Concerns over this issue among the policymaking community are apparent in recent publications of
the OECD (2004, 2005a,b) and European Commission (2005). The importance of this matter for organised
labour is evident in ongoing discussions within the trade union movement about the implications of deeper
integration for the wage and employment prospects of their members (see, for example, the website of the
European Trade Union Confederation, www.etuc.org)
2In reality, open shop arrangement, where the union is recognised for bargaining purposes but member-
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Figure 1: Union density and coverage in the OECD in 2000 (percentage of wage and salary
earners)
at home induces a competitive response from the overseas rival, making the con°ict more
costly to the local ¯rm. For this reason, the ¯rm is willing to sacri¯ce a larger share of its
quasi-rents in order to preclude such a dispute. The implications of this mechanism for
the impact of trade liberalisation on wages are profound: ¯rstly, trade liberalisation may
lead to higher bargained wages even if no trade exists in equilibrium; secondly, wages need
not fall in absolute terms as the economy moves from autarky to free trade.
This paper builds on the work of several predecessors. In an international duopoly
model with monopoly unions in both countries, Huizinga (1993) ¯nds that the wage level
is lower with free trade than in autarky. This is because, although market expansion as a
result of trade liberalisation causes wages to rise, this is more than o®set by the increased
product market competition which serves to moderate wages. In two in°uential papers,
Naylor (1998, 1999) argues however that the conclusion that trade liberalisation leads to
wage reductions is a special, rather than a general, case and results from a comparison
of polar ends of the possible range of trade regimes. Modelling the process of integration
3as a marginal reduction in trade costs, he arrives at the striking conclusion that, within
a context of two-way trade, further liberalisation reduces the labour demand elasticity
which leads to unionised labour setting higher wages i.e. with two-way trade, the market
expansion e®ect dominates the market discipline e®ect. Note however that wages under
free trade are still lower than those under autarky.3
Various extensions of Naylor's results have been made. Munch and Skaksen (2002)
distinguish between ¯xed and variable trade costs when both labour markets are unionised.
They conclude that while a fall in ¯xed trade costs leads to an unambiguous fall in wages,
the implication of a reduction in variable costs is ambiguous. Piperakis et al. (2003), unlike
Naylor (1998), allow for asymmetry between the countries. They show that if the market
size of the two countries di®ers widely, a reduction in trade costs can lead to decreases in
wages, employment and welfare in the country with the larger market. This is because
the larger economy has less to gain, relatively speaking, from the market expansion e®ect.
The paper by Lommerud et al. (2003) then shows that if one country is unionised
and the other is not, a much wider range of trade regimes is possible than previously
considered. Under autarky, all trade is prevented by the level of trade costs, and wages
are set in isolation in each country. However, as trade costs fall, the ability of organised
labour to obtain higher wages in the unionised country will be limited by the possibility
that ¯rms from the low wage (non-unionised country) will begin to export. This leads to
what Lommerud et al. (2003) call the import deterrence regime. If liberalisation continues,
trade costs will eventually fall to such an extent that trade begins and the foreign ¯rm
starts to export. One-way trade then continues until trade costs fall to a level such that
the unions ¯nd it in their best interests to adopt a low wage strategy in order to induce
the domestic ¯rm to export as well. Under two-way trade, Naylor's result prevails as the
market expansion associated with further liberalisation causes wages to rise. As with the
preceding papers, however, wages are shown to be higher in autarky compared with free
(or indeed one-way) trade.4
A common feature of the literature reviewed above is the adoption of the monopoly
3The movement from autarky to two-way trade is triggered when the unions in the two countries ¯nd
it optimal to abandon their previous high wage strategies, and instead lower their wage demands in order
to allow their ¯rms to compete internationally. This causes a discontinuity in the wage level, as union
demands are adjusted downwards. However the union gains from the rapid expansion in employment that
results. The wage fall, as the union discretely moves from a high wage strategy to a low wage strategy,
outweighs any subsequent expansion in wages.
4Within this framework Lommerud et al. (2003) then examine how wage setting impacts on the location
decisions of multinational ¯rms. They argue that if the ¯rm has plants located in both countries then this
would serve to simplify the wage schedules, since the union no longer gains by adopting a low wage
strategy in order to induce its plant to export. Thus wages fall continuously from autarky to free trade.
More generally, the option of locating abroad serves to weaken the position of the union.
4union model to characterise wage determination in unionised sectors. Within such setting,
equilibrium wages are governed by the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage
rate. Therefore, trade liberalisation impacts on wages if and only if it a®ects the trade-
o® between wages and employment faced by the union. The present paper extends this
literature by adopting a framework in which wages are the outcome of a Nash bargain
between a ¯rm and an open shop union. Since a ¯rm may continue to operate with its
non-union workers in the event of a strike, its fallback position depends on union density.
The possibility also exists that the foreign rival will export to meet a shortfall in product
supply as a result of a strike, which acts as a discipline on the ¯rm and serves to boost
the union's position. Thus, unionised wages may rise with trade liberalisation even if no
trade occurs in equilibrium. This is what we call the import threat regime, which is new
to the literature.
In contrast to the previous literature, wages may also be higher with free trade than
under autarky. With low levels of density the union is only able to capture a small
proportion of the relatively large surplus under autarky. Its position under free trade is
stronger. Although the surplus to be bargained over is smaller, a strike not only causes
disruption to production but also elicits a competitive response from the overseas ¯rm.
This reduces the ¯rm's strike pro¯ts further and serves to bolster the position of the
union. Hence, when workers are represented by open shop unions, wages need neither fall
monotonically as trade liberalisation occurs, nor indeed to fall in absolute terms as an
economy moves from autarky to free trade.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
setup and solution. Section 3 then analyses the impact of reductions in trade costs on
negotiated wages, for di®erent levels of union density. In Section 4 we discuss some
extensions of our model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
Consider an international duopoly industry. Firm 1 is located in country 1 and ¯rm 2 in
country 2. The ¯rms produce a homogeneous commodity under constant returns to scale
with labour as the only input, and output per worker being normalised to unity. Product
demand is linear, with the inverse demand function in country i given by:
pi = a ¡ b(yii + yji); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (1)
5where, a;b > 0, pi is the price in country i and yii and yij denote, respectively, the sales
of the ¯rm located in country i to markets i and j. In line with Brander (1981), we
assume that each producer views each country as a separate market and that there is a
constant trade cost of t per unit of commodity exported. Competition in the two markets
is Cournot.
In country 2 the ¯rm recruits workers from a competitive labour market at a wage rate
wc
2, which for simplicity is normalised to zero. In country 1, there is a single open shop
union that represents all workers employed at ¯rm 1.5 Union density ¹ can vary between 0
and 1. All workers covered by the union receive the same bargained wage w, independent
of their membership status.6
Union density is exogenously given when collective bargaining takes place. Therefore,
we are implicitly assuming that the individual decision to become a union member is
independent of wage formation. Here we note that this assumption is consistent with
the literature on open shop unions. Since the bargained wage is a pure public good
and union membership involves a private cost (the membership fee), there is a free-rider
problem associated with the individual decision to become unionised. In order to explain
voluntary union membership in the context of an open shop union, the existing literature
typically assumes that the union provides a private good to its members. Examples of
this excludable good, available only through membership, are privileged access to grievance
procedures or reputation gains from complying with a social custom. The valuation of
these bene¯ts are assumed to vary across individuals, and a worker will become a union
member if the utility gain associated with the private good provided by the union more
than compensates for the utility loss caused by the membership fee. In this context, the
individual membership decision may be independent of the collective wage.7
In country 1, there is also a perfectly competitive sector where workers can earn the
5Examples of international oligopoly models in which the labour market is unionised in one country and
perfectly competitive in the other include Lommerud et al. (2003, 2006) and Straume (2003). The model
could be extended by allowing for an industry-level open shop union covering workers in n > 1 domestic
¯rms. Whilst that would change our quantitative results, it can be shown that it would not a®ect our
main qualitative ¯ndings.
6The pure public good nature of the bargained wage is a distinctive feature of open shop unions - see,
for example, Naylor and Cripps (1993) and Naylor and Rauum (1993).
7Naylor and Cripps (1993) and Booth and Chatterji (1995) argue that membership is increasing in
the collective wage. This result, however, hinges on the assumption that the indirect utility function of
each worker is concave, which guarantees that the utility loss by paying the membership fee is decreasing
in the wage. Under this assumption, a higher wage ensures that even workers that place a relatively
low valuation on the union excludable good rationally decide to become union members. However, this
(restrictive) assumption is not common to all papers on `open shop' unions. Naylor and Rauum (1993),
Corneo (1993, 1995) assume that the marginal utility of income of each member is constant, which implies
that the individual decision to become a union member is independent of the collective wage.
6competitive wage wc
1 = wc
2 = 0. Pro¯ts for the two ¯rms are given by:
¼1 = [a ¡ b(y11 + y21) ¡ w]y11 + [a ¡ b(y22 + y12) ¡ w ¡ t]y12 (2)
¼2 = [a ¡ b(y22 + y12)]y22 + [a ¡ b(y11 + y21) ¡ t]y21 (3)
Following Naylor and Cripps (1993) and Naylor and Raaum (1993), we consider a sequence
of contract periods. In the event of a strike the ¯rm is able to employ only that fraction
of its workers who are not union members under the terms of the contract negotiated
in the previous period, and furthermore that the ¯rm neglects the impact of its current
employment decisions on future wage negotiations.
Denote the output of ¯rm 1 in market j in the previous contract period by y1j.8 Under
these assumptions, when ¯rm 1 only supplies the home market, its output under a strike
is given by ys
11 = (1 ¡ ¹)y11, while it is given by ys
11 + ys
12 = (1 ¡ ¹)(y11 + y12) if ¯rm 1
serves both markets.9 Firm 1's pro¯ts in case of a strike are then given by
¼s
1 = [a ¡ b(ys
11 + ys
21) ¡ w]ys
11 + [a ¡ b(ys
22 + ys
12) ¡ w ¡ t]ys
12; (4)
where w is the wage rate negotiated in the previous contract period and ys
2j is the sales
volume of ¯rm 2 in market j in the case of a strike in ¯rm 1.
We adopt a standard right-to-manage model where the ¯rm is allowed to set employ-
ment to maximise pro¯ts given the wage. In each contract period, the outcome is modelled
as a two-stage game. In Stage 1 the unionised ¯rm and bargains over wages through a
Nash bargaining process, for a given level of union density. In Stage 2, both ¯rms decide
on their level of production, and hence employment, taking as given the wage of the other
¯rm and taking into consideration their labour demand schedule. In order to solve the
model analytically, we proceed by backwards induction. We begin by examining Stage
2 and solve for the optimal production decisions of the ¯rms. Once these are known we
can examine Stage 1, and solve for the steady-state wage level that results from the wage
bargain.
8That is, ¯rm 1's pro¯t maximising level of output for market j, given the wage rate negotiated in the
previous contract period.
9In the case of a strike, the ¯rm may ¯nd it optimal to reallocate output across markets, and hence in
general y
s
11 6= (1 ¡ ¹)y11 and y
s
12 6= (1 ¡ ¹)y12.
72.2 Solving for production
Solving the ¯rst order conditions for pro¯t maximisation yields the standard reaction





























In order to obtain the equilibrium levels of output for each ¯rm in each market, we can
solve eqs. (5) to (8) simultaneously. Given the constraint that all production quantities






3b(a ¡ 2w + t); 1
3b(a + w ¡ 2t)
if t ¸ e t(w)







3b(a + t + w); 1
3b(a ¡ 2t ¡ 2w)
if t ¸ b t(w)
if t < b t(w)
(10)
with e t(w) = (a + w)=2 and b t(w) = a=2 ¡ w. Boundary e t(w) separates the no-trade and
one-way trade regimes, while b t(w) separates the one-way trade and two-way trade regimes.
While the boundaries between trade regimes are therefore dependent on the endogenous
wage rate, the outcome of the wage bargain in turn depends on which trade regime we
are in. In order to solve this problem of mutual dependency, we proceed as follows:
We exogenously specify the respective trade regime, solve the regime-speci¯c bargaining
problem and use the resulting wage rates to express the regime boundaries in terms of
model parameters.
2.3 Solving the wage bargain
In stage 1, the wage paid by the ¯rm in country 1 is modelled as the outcome of a Nash






8where superscript r denotes the respective trade regime. Union utility is given by U1, while
Us
1 is the disagreement payo® of the union. For simplicity, we assume that the objective
of the union is to maximise wages, and so by implication, Us
1 is the wage in event of a
strike.10 The strike pay is assumed to be exogenous, and it is set equal to zero without
further loss of generality.11
In the absence of international trade, ¼1 is given by eq. (2), with y12 = y21 = 0 and
y11 substituted from eq. (9). In order to fully specify the Nash bargain we need to ¯nd ¼s
1,
the unionised ¯rm's pro¯ts in the event of a strike. Given that output of ¯rm 1 is reduced
during a strike, it is possible that ¯rm 2 would start exporting i.e. ys
21 could be positive,
even with y21 = 0. From eq. (9), ¯rm 1's production in the event of a strike is given by
ys
11 = (1 ¡ ¹)(a ¡ w)=(2b), and substitution into the reaction function for ¯rm 2, eq. (7),
yields ys
21 = (a(1+¹)+w(1¡¹)¡2t)=(4b). The value for ¼s
1 is found by substituting into
eq. (4).
The situation where ys
21 is strictly positive is labelled the import threat (it) case. Even
though there is no trade in equilibrium, the fact that ¯rm 2 will export in the event of
a strike a®ects ¼s
1 and hence the outcome of the bargaining process. It is easily checked
that ys
21 ¸ 0 holds for
t ·
a(1 + ¹) + w(1 ¡ ¹)
2
(12)
For t above the threshold, what we call the pure autarky (a) case, the disagreement payo®
is given by eq. (4) with ys
12 = ys
21 = 0, since the high trade costs preclude any impact of
the foreign ¯rm on the domestic ¯rm's con°ict payo®. To solve the wage bargain in both
regimes, we substitute for ¼1 and ¼s
1 in eq. (11), and use U1 = w and Us
1 = 0. In the ¯rst
order condition for a maximum, we furthermore impose the condition that in a steady
state equilibrium the wage has to be constant, and we therefore have w = w. Solving for
10We show in Section 4 that the main results of the model go through if the union maximises rents
instead of wages. The assumption of wage maximisation might be justi¯ed in situations in which the
representative union member is protected against redundancy by a seniority rule or insulated from layo®s
by a su±ciently high turnover (see Oswald, 1985).
11While the absolute size of the strike pay does not matter for any of the main results, some results
derived in the following depend on the fact that, by setting to zero both the inside and outside options of
the worker, we have assumed them to be equal. This assumption is relaxed in Section 4 below.
9the wage in these two situations yields:12
wit =
a(1 + ¹2) ¡ 2t(1 ¡ ¹)






Substituting either eq. (14) or eq. (13) into eq. (12) gives the threshold level of t that
separates the true autarky and the import threat in steady state:
tA =
¹(¹ + 1) + 1
¹2 + 2
a (15)
We can also ¯nd the lowest level of trade costs for which the import threat regime is an
equilibrium solution. Substituting wit from eq. (13) into the boundary condition e t(w) =
(w + a)=2 gives:
tB =
¹(¹ + 1) + 2
¹(¹ + 1) + 4
a (16)
In order for eq. (16) to be the actual borderline between the no-trade and one-way trade
regimes, it must also be the solution of e t(w) for the wage bargained under one-way trade.
We now check whether this is the case.
Under one-way trade ¯rm 1 produces for its own market and ¯rm 2 sells to both
markets. From eq. (9), ¯rm 1's sales to its own market in the event of a strike are given
by ys
11 = (1 ¡ ¹)(a ¡ 2w + t)=(3b). Substituting ys
11 into eq. (7) gives ¯rm 2's exports
in the event of a strike as ys
21 = [a(¹ + 2) + 2w(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ t(4 ¡ ¹)]=(6b). Solving the
Nash bargaining problem as outlined above for the no-trade situation, the steady-state
bargained wage under one-way trade is:
wow =
(a + t)(¹ + 1)¹
2¹(¹ + 1) + 8
(17)
We can ¯nd the highest level of trade costs for which the foreign ¯rm ¯nds it pro¯table to
export to the domestic market by substituting eq. (17) into the boundary condition e t(w),
giving:
tC =
3¹(¹ + 1) + 8
3¹(¹ + 1) + 16
a (18)
It can be easily checked that tC < tB for ¹ 2 (0;1], so there is one-way trade for trade
12With ¹ = 1, we get w
it = w
a, and the import threat regime vanishes. It is easy to see why this has to
be the case: With full union membership, ¯rm 1 shuts down in the event of a strike, and hence its strike
pro¯ts are zero, no matter what the action of the foreign competitor may be.
10costs below (and su±ciently close to) tC, while we are in the import threat regime for
trade costs above (and su±ciently close to) tB. What about trade cost levels between
tC and tB? The equilibrium wage rate in this range of trade cost parameters is found
by solving e t(w) = (a + w)=2 for w. Following Lommerud et al. (2003), we label this the
import deterrence regime, and wages are set according to:
wid = 2t ¡ a (19)
The signi¯cance of tB therefore is to mark the separation of the import threat regime
(where foreign ¯rms would never enter the domestic market in the absence of a strike) and
the import deterrence regime (where wage setting has to be used to prevent foreign ¯rms
from entering the domestic market). There are imports in neither of the two regimes, but
{ as we will see in the next section { the reaction of wages to changes in t is fundamentally
di®erent between the two.
The borderline between the one-way trade and two-way trade regimes is found in
a similar fashion to the one between no trade and one-way trade: We solve the wage
bargain for both trade regimes adjacent to the borderline, and substitute the resulting
values for w into b t(w). We already found wow in eq. (17), and therefore turn to the
wage bargain under two-way trade. From eqs. (9) and (10), output during a strike equals
ys
11+ys
12 = (1¡¹)(2a¡4w¡t)=(3b), and it is straightforward to show that for su±ciently
high levels of t, it is pro¯t maximising for ¯rm 1 to stop exporting during a strike and
only serve the domestic market.13 Proceeding as above, the bargained wage for this case
is derived as
wtw1 =
4a(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 3) ¡ t(¹(4¹ ¡ 11) + 15) ¡ ª
8(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 5)
(20)
where ª ´ [64a2 ¡ 16at(9¹ ¡ 5) ¡ t2 (¹(63¹ + 18) + 335)]
1
2. Substituting either eq. (17)
or eq. (20) into b t(w) = a=2 ¡ w gives the level of trade cost separating the one-way trade
and two-way trade regimes as:
tD =
4
3¹(¹ + 1) + 8
a (21)
For su±ciently low trade cost, it becomes optimal for ¯rm 1 to serve the foreign market
even if there is a strike. The steady-state bargained wage in this case is given by:
wtw2 =
¹(¹ + 1)(2a ¡ t)
4(¹(¹ + 1) + 4)
; (22)























Figure 2: The boundaries between trade regimes in (t, ¹)-space
and the trade cost level below which it occurs equals
tE =
8(1 ¡ ¹)
¹(3¹ ¡ 1) + 16
a: (23)
The wage level under free trade wft is obtained by setting t = 0 in (22).
2.4 The boundaries between trade regimes
It is helpful, for expositional purposes, to summarise the results from the above section
diagrammatically. Figure 2 plots the critical level of trade costs that separates each trade
regime against the level of union density. From (15), (16), (18), (21) and (23), it can be
easily checked that tA > tB > tC > tD > tE if ¹ 2 (0;1].
When union density is zero then there is no asymmetry between the countries and the
only possible trade regimes are autarky and two-way trade. For ¹ 2 (0;1], the possibility
of asymmetric trade regimes exists. For given levels of ¹ 2 (0;1], decreases in t will move
the equilibrium from autarky, to import threat, to import deterrence, to one-way trade, to
two-way trade. It can be seen that whilst tA, tB and tC are increasing in union density,
tD and tE are decreasing in union density. The intuition for this is straightforward: On
the one hand, in all regimes except import deterrence, bargained wages are increasing in
12union density.14 On the other hand, the boundaries between the trade regimes depend on
the di®erence in the two ¯rms' marginal (including trade) cost of serving the respective
markets. This implies that, with increasing union density, higher trade costs are needed
in order to prevent ¯rm 2 from serving market 1, explaining the positive slope of tA, tB
and tC. However, lower trade costs are needed to make ¯rm 1 competitive in the foreign
market, explaining the negative slope of tD and tE.
3 The impact of trade liberalisation on wages
Now that we have described the trade regimes that can prevail in equilibrium for given
levels of trade costs and union density, we are able to consider the impact of moving from
a position of autarky to a situation of free international trade. From eq. (13) we know
that in autarky, i.e. with t > tA, the wage does not change with economic integration.
Not only is ¯rm 2 unable to export in equilibrium, but trade costs are high enough to
prevent ¯rm 2's exports even in the case of a strike at ¯rm 1. Thus, neither the unionised
¯rm's pro¯ts nor its con°ict payo® are a®ected by trade liberalisation, and consequently
the same is true for the Nash wage. If trade costs fall below tA, we enter the import threat
regime and a more subtle result emerges:




increases the bargained wage even though no trade exists in equilibrium.





¹(¹ + 2) + 3
< 0
if ¹ 2 (0;1).
The reason for this result is that (holding wages constant) whilst pro¯ts remain una®ected
by economic integration (since there is still no trade in equilibrium), the prospect of
imports in the event of a strike negatively a®ects the ¯rm's con°ict payo® through its e®ect
on the domestic price. Therefore, when trade costs fall below tA, the pro¯t di®erential
¼1 ¡ ¼s
1 increases, and, hence, so does the bargained wage. The lower the trade cost, the
higher would be the amount of imports in the event of a strike, and hence the higher is
the bargained wage.
14This is immediate for w
a, w
ow and w




13Once tB is reached, further reductions in the trade cost decrease rather than increase
wages, as shown in eq. (19). We are now in the import deterrence regime, known from
Lommerud et al. (2003), where wages have to be lowered along with the trade cost in
order to prevent ¯rm 2 from exporting to country 1. At tC, ¯rm 2 starts exporting,
leading to one-way trade. Within the one-way trade regime, trade liberalisation leads to
a further decrease in the wage rate, as we can see from (17). Hence, the marginal impact
of trade liberalisation on the bargained wage in the import deterrence and one-way trade
regimes is similar to the one in the model by Lommerud et al. (2003). However, if we
make the discrete comparison between autarky and one-way trade, we ¯nd the following
result which is speci¯c to our setup with open shop unions, and which is explained by the
e®ect of foreign competition on ¼s
1:
Proposition 2 Negotiated wages under one-way trade are always above the autarky level
if 0 < ¹ < b ¹ = 0:492.
Proof. Since (17) is strictly increasing in t, we may ¯nd the lowest wage under one-way
trade by substituting from eq. (21) into eq. (17). This yields wow jt=tD =
3¹(¹+1)
16+6¹(¹+1)a,
which is larger than wa, given in eq. (14), if ¹ 2 (0;0:492):
If trade costs are lowered below tD, ¯rm 1 starts exporting and we have two way trade with
the wage being given by (20). In this regime, the wage function is strictly convex and its
response to reductions in trade costs depends on the level of union density. If union density
is relatively high ¹ 2 (2
3;1], the wage rate changes non-monotonically with t: The wage
initially decreases as trade costs fall and then eventually rises for lower values of trade costs.
Conversely, when union density is relatively low ¹ 2 (0; 2
3], the wage decreases with trade
liberalisation in the full range of trade costs consistent with this regime, t 2 (tE;tD).15 If
trade costs fall below tE the equilibrium wage (22) unambiguously increases as trade costs
fall.
A comparison of wage levels under autarky and free international trade shows, in
contrast to the established literature, that union wages need not fall in absolute terms as
the economy moves from autarky to free trade. We ¯nd the following:
Proposition 3 A movement from autarky to free trade results in higher Nash equilibrium
wages if 0 < ¹ < e ¹ = 0:312.
Proof. Using (14) and (22), it can be easily checked that wa = wft if and only if ¹ = 0
or ¹ = 0:312. Straightforward computations show that both wa and wft are weakly
15Appendix B o®ers a proof of this result.
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Figure 3: The impact of trade liberalisation on wages (b ¹ > e ¹)
In order to gain intuition for this result, note that when ¹ = 0 the bargained wage
is zero under either trade regime because, with zero union membership, ¯rm 1 does not
lose anything in case of a strike. However, when ¹ > 0 the wage levels may diverge
between trade regimes. Under autarky, increasing ¹ from 0 has only a second-order e®ect
on the disagreement payo®. On the other hand, there is a ¯rst order negative e®ect on the
disagreement payo® under free trade due to both the induced increase in ¯rm 2's exports
and the induced fall in ¯rm 1's exports. Therefore, for su±ciently small union densities,
the pro¯t di®erential ¼1¡¼s
1 (and therefore the wage) is smaller under autarky than under
free trade. At the opposite extreme with ¹ = 1, ¼1 ¡ ¼s
1 is larger in autarky than with
free trade. This follows from the fact that, with full union membership, the disagreement
payo® is zero in either trade regime while, in the absence of a strike, the pro¯t is higher
15under autarky than under free trade. Together, this implies that, at some intermediate
level of density, pro¯t di®erentials and therefore wage rates are equal between regimes
(¹ = 0:312).
The wage pro¯les are illustrated in Figure 3 for the two borderline cases featured
in propositions 2 and 3, namely ¹ = e ¹ and ¹ = b ¹, and for a third case where union
membership is higher than b ¹, but smaller than one.
4 Extensions
Up to this point, we have deliberately used a parsimonious setup to highlight our main
¯ndings and their underlying mechanisms. In the following sub-sections, we check if our
key results remain valid when relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions. In doing so,
we extend our basic setting in three di®erent directions.
4.1 Rent maximising union
In the basic model we have assumed for simplicity that the union maximises wages. We
now investigate if our central results survive if the union cares about employment as
well. To do so, we follow Naylor (1998, 1999) and Lommerud et al. (2003) in assuming
that the union aims to maximise rents. In other words, we suppose that union utility
is U1 = w(y11 + y12): While this generates more complex analytical solutions for the
negotiated wage under some trade regimes, we show in Appendix C that the main ¯ndings
of the basic model remain qualitatively una®ected. This is because the central mechanism
underlying the novel results of the preceding analysis ¡ the e®ect of trade liberalisation
on the ¯rm's disagreement payo® ¡ does not depend upon the union's objective function.
4.2 Open shop trade unions in both countries
We can allow ¯rm 2 be unionised as well. In order to keep the model analytically tractable
we consider the perfectly symmetric case (¹1 = ¹2) and suppose that wages are set simul-
taneously in the two countries. If the countries are identical in all respects, the possibility
of asymmetric trade regimes vanishes, as would be expected. Therefore Proposition 3
no longer applies. Nevertheless, we show in Appendix C2 that the results established in
Propositions 1 and 2 remain qualitatively unaltered, as each ¯rm would still expand its
own production in the event of a labour dispute in the other country.
164.3 A binding union membership constraint
Up until this point we have excluded by assumption the possibility that unions are too
weak to negotiate wages above the competitive level. We did this by setting the strike pay
equal to the competitive wage.
It can be readily shown that for strictly positive levels of wc (and with strike pay still
being normalised to zero), the minimum level of union membership needed to lift wages
above the competitive wage becomes strictly positive in all trade regimes. This accords
with the result of Naylor and Cripps (1993) in a single ¯rm-single union context.
With wc > 0, the pro¯t function of ¯rm 2 is given by (2) with w2 = wc. Under
the assumption that the union is able to increase wages above the competitive level, and
solving the model as in Section 2, we ¯nd the boundaries between the trade regimes:16
tA =
¹(¹ + 1) + 1
¹2 + 2
a ¡ wc (19')
tB =
(¹(¹ + 1) + 2)a ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)wc
¹(¹ + 1) + 4
(20')
tC =
3¹(¹ + 1) + 8
3¹(¹ + 1) + 16
a ¡ wc (23')
tD =
4(a + wc)
3¹(¹ + 1) + 8
(25')
tE =
8(1 ¡ ¹)(a + wc)
¹(3¹ ¡ 1) + 16
(33')
The new situation when wc > 0 is most easily analysed with the help of Figure 4. This
shows the new boundaries between the trade regimes in (t;¹)-space. With a competitive
wage greater than zero, tA, tB and tC shift downwards relative to the case of considered
in Section 2, while tD and tE shifts upwards. This is because an increase in wc, ceteris
paribus, makes ¯rm 1 more competitive. Hence, it can keep ¯rm 2 out of its home market
even if trade costs are lower, and can serve the foreign market when trade costs are higher.
For a given competitive wage, the locus ¹min separates the combinations of t and ¹
for which the union is able to bargain a wage greater than wc (to the right of the locus)
from those for which it is to weak and where w = wc (to the left of this locus). The locus
16Note that these boundaries will not be relevant if t and ¹ are such that the bargained wage is smaller
than w
c. The explicit formulation for the equilibrium wages in each of the regimes is derived in Appendix
C. Using these expressions, one can show that the bargained wage tends to zero (the strike pay) as union
density tends to zero. As the strike pay is smaller than the competitive wage, there is now some level of





























Figure 4: The boundaries between trade regimes with a binding membership constraint
is derived analytically for each of the regimes by setting the respective equilibrium wage
equal to wc and solving for or t or ¹.17 Three di®erent regions may now be distinguished.
In Region 1 (R1), the model collapses to the standard reciprocal dumping model of
Brander (1981). This is the region associated with the values of union density, ¹ 2 [0;¹¤];
for which, independently of the trade cost, the union can never increase wages above
the competitive level. Within this region the equilibrium trade regime will be either no
international trade if t ¸ 1
2(a ¡ wc) or two-way trade if t < 1
2(a ¡ wc).
In Region 3 (R3) the level of union density, ¹ 2 [¹¤¤;1]; is such that the union is
always able to raise the wages above the competitive level. For each level of union density,
the level of the trade cost will determine the equilibrium trade regime. This segment
corresponds with the model in the previous section.
Within Region 2 (R2), ¹ 2 (¹¤;¹¤¤) a richer con¯guration of outcomes is possible,
since the competitive wage will sometimes act as a binding constraint on the bargain. By
inspecting the behaviour of ¹min within this region, we may provide an answer to our
initial question: how does trade liberalisation a®ect the minimum level of union density
that unions must achieve in order to increase wages above the competitive level? From
17The analytical results are presented in Appendix C3.
18Figure 4, it is clear that the response of ¹min to reductions in t is exactly the opposite to
that of negotiated wages in Section 3 for intermediate levels of density. The comparison
of ¹min under autarky and free trade allows us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4 A movement from autarky to free trade will induce a fall in the minimum
level of density that the union must achieve in order to raise wages above the competitive
level if wc 2 (0; 1
19a).
Proof. See Appendix D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of international duopoly to investigate the e®ect
of trade liberalisation on collective bargaining when workers are represented by open shop
unions. The key message of the paper is that, when union density is less than 100%, trade
liberalisation impacts on bargained wages via a previously unnoticed channel: Fiercer
international competition (actual or potential) reduces the fallback position of the ¯rm in
the event of a strike, thereby helping the union in the bargain. In other words, a labour
dispute at home induces a competitive response from the overseas rival, making the con°ict
more costly to local capital owners. As a result, the ¯rm is willing to sacri¯ce a larger
share of its quasi-rents in order to preclude such a dispute. This previously unnoticed
mechanism generates additional trade regimes to those found in Naylor (1998, 1999) and
Lommerud et al (2003), and a di®erent response of wages to trade liberalisation. Notably,
we ¯nd that, with intermediate levels of density, trade liberalisation may lead to higher
wages even if no trade exists in equilibrium, and that negotiated wages need not fall in
absolute terms as the economy moves from autarky to free trade.
Clearly, the relevance this mechanism for real world bargaining rests on the validity of
two key ingredients. The ¯rst is the assumption that unionised ¯rms continue to operate
at reduced capacity during a labour dispute. Here we note that, besides being standard
in the literature on open shop unions, this assumption is supported by empirical evidence.
In fact, studies by Gramm (1991), Gramm and Schnell (1994) and Cramton and Tracy
(1998) report evidence that ¯rms' average operating capacity at struck facilities remains
well above 50% of the normal level. The other key ingredient is that the con°ict payo®
of the ¯rm in the event of a strike is negatively a®ected by the response of foreign rivals
(via its e®ect on the product price). While this result arises directly from the standard
Cournot model of competition, it should be acknowledged that its empirical relevance
depends crucially on the price responsiveness to output shortages imposed by the strike.
19There is anecdotal evidence that prices do indeed react to strikes in this way.18 The
available scienti¯c evidence also points in the same direction: In a study for the North-
American automobile industry, Gunderson and Melino (1987) investigate the e®ect of
several strikes on car prices over the 1966-79 period and report evidence of sizable price
increases during the months of the con°ict. To the extent that su±ciently low trade
barriers allow competitors to meet part of the shortfall in production originated by the
strike, the key mechanism highlighted in this paper should be expected to apply.
Appendix
A Nash bargaining with two-way trade in equilibrium
Under two-way trade, total sales of ¯rm 1 in the event of a strike are equal to the output
that the ¯rm would be able to realise with its non-striking workers, at the wage rate
negotiated in the previous contract period w:
ys
11 + ys
12 = (1 ¡ ¹)(y11 + y12) = (1 ¡ ¹)
2a ¡ 4w ¡ t
3b
(A.1)
Taking this constraint into account, the ¯rm allocates output across markets in a pro¯t





















The threshold level of trade costs below which ys
12 is strictly positive is given by:
t =




\Mark Brown, leader of the British Columbia Labor Relations Board, has been called in
to help facilitate the negotiations in the hope that a strike can be averted. Many analysts
have said that a strike would rock the already extremely tight lead and zinc concentrate
marketplaces and cause prices to rise." American Metal Market, 6 July 2005.
\Forestry company M-real's President and CEO Hannu Anttila believes the [Finnish] paper
industry labour dispute has had some positive e®ects as well. In M-real's April-June interim
report, Anttila asserts that owing to the industrial action the market for most paper types is
now more balanced, which in turn may contribute to a price increase." Helsingin Sanomat-
International Edition, 26 June 2007.
20For trade costs above this level, all the production of the non-striking workers would be
used to supply the home market, giving:
ys
11 = (1 ¡ ¹)
2a ¡ 4w ¡ t
3b
(A.5)
In this case, the export level of ¯rm 2 is given by:
ys
21 =
(2¹ + 1)a + 4w(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ t(¹ + 2)
6b
(A.6)
and the steady-state bargained wage is given by (20). Substituting (20) into (A.4) gives
the threshold level of trade cost in (23). For trade costs below tE, the home ¯rm would
export even in the event of a strike. In this scenario, ¯rm 2's sales to the two markets
would be given by:
ys
21 =





2a(2 + ¹) + 4w(1 ¡ ¹) + t(4 ¡ ¹)
12b
(A.8)
This implies the steady-state bargained wage in (22).
B Properties of wit and wtw1
Implications of the level of union density for wit




2t(5 + ¹(2 ¡ ¹)) ¡ 2a(1 ¡ ¹(¹ + 2))
(¹(¹ + 2) + 3)2 (B.1)
which is strictly positive whenever ¹ 2 [0:414;1]. If ¹ 2 (0;0:414), (B.1) is only positive
when t is high enough relative to a. This, however, is always true within the interval of
trade costs consistent with this regime, t 2 [tB;tA]. Evaluating (B.1) at the inferior limit







(¹(¹ + 1) + 4)(¹(¹ + 2) + 3)
> 0
which implies that @wit
@¹ > 0 if t 2 [tB;tA]:
21Figure 5: Derivative of wtwI with respect to ¹
Implications of the level of union density for wtw1




4a(4¹ ¡ 1) + t(11 ¡ 8¹) + 9t(8a + t(1 + 7¹))=ª
8(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 5)
+
(4¹ ¡ 1)(4a(¹(1 ¡ 2¹) ¡ 3) + t(¹(4¹ ¡ 11) + 15) + ª
8(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 5)
(B.2)
which is strictly positive when t 2 (tE;tD). To prove this, we substitute t in (B.2) by
®tD+(1¡®)tE; where ® 2 [0;1], and plot the resulting expression in (¹;®)¡space (Figure
5). The algebraic proof of this result is here presented for the two extreme cases ® = 0








if t = tD
if t = tE
Impact of trade liberalisation on wtw1
When ¹ 2 (2
3;1], the wage function wtw1 :
19Proof for intermediate values of ® is available upon request.
22(i) Decreases with trade liberalisation if t 2 (t¤;tD)
(ii) Reaches its minimum level when t = t¤
(iii) Increases with trade liberalisation if t 2 (tE;t¤).
where,
t¤ =
70 ¡ 151¹ + 50¹2 ¡ 9¹3 + 3(14 ¡ ¹(5 ¡ ¹))
1
2(15 ¡ ¹(11 ¡ 4¹))
(14 ¡ ¹(5 ¡ ¹))(9¹(7¹ + 2) + 335)
8a:




(8a(9¹ ¡ 5) + t(335 + 9¹(7¹ + 2)))=ª + ¹(11 ¡ 4¹) ¡ 15
8(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 5)
(B.3)












if t = tD, and thus > 0 if ¹ 2 (2
3;1]
if t = t¤
if t = tE; and thus < 0 if ¹ 2 (2
3;1]
When ¹ 2 (0; 2
3], the wage function decreases with trade liberalisation in the full range of
trade costs consistent with this regime, t 2 [tE;tD]: It can be easily checked that:
(i) t¤ = tE and @wtw1
@t jt=tE = 0
(ii) t¤ > tE and @wtw1
@t jt=tE > 0
if ¹ = 2
3
if ¹ 2 (0; 2
3]




(64a2 + 16at(5 ¡ 9¹) ¡ t2(9¹(7¹ + 2) + 335))3=2 (B.4)
This partial derivative is strictly positive when t 2 (tE;tD). To prove this, we substitute t
in (B.4) by ®tD+(1¡®)tE with ® 2 [0;1], and plot the resulting expression in (¹;®)¡space
(Figure 6). The algebraic proof of this result is here presented for the two extreme cases







if t = tD
if t = tE
20Proof for intermediate values of ® is available upon request.
23Figure 6: Second derivative of wtwI with respect to t
C Extensions to the basic model
C.1 Rent maximising union
For the sake of brevity, we con¯ne our attention to the expressions needed to show that the
main ¯ndings of the basic model remain qualitatively unchanged. When U1 = w(y11+y12),






a(5 + ¹(2 + 3¹)) ¡ 4t(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ §
4(1 + ¹)2 (C.2)
wow =
(a + t)¹(1 + ¹)








(a(5 + ¹(2 + 3¹)) ¡ 4t(1 ¡ ¹))2 ¡ 8a(1 + ¹)2(a(1 + ¹2) ¡ 2t(1 ¡ ¹))
¤1
2. In
this situation, the boundaries between trade regimes are given by:
24Figure 7: Derivative of wit with respect to t
tA =




4 + 3¹(1 + ¹)
8 + 4¹(1 + ¹)
a (C.6)
tD =
¹(¹ + 1) + 4
8 + 5¹(1 + ¹)
a (C.7)
Implications for Propositions 1, 2 and 3
To check whether Proposition 1 remains valid, we compute the partial derivative of (C.2)












From (C.8) one can see that @wit
@t is strictly negative when t 2 (tB;tA) and ¹ 2 (0;1):
To prove this result, we substitute t in (C.8) by ®tA + (1 ¡ ®)tB with ® 2 [0;1], and plot
the plot the resulting expression in (¹;®)¡space (Figure 7).








if t = tA
if t = tB
We now examine how the assumption of rent maximisation a®ects Proposition 2. Substi-
tuting (C.7) into (C.3) yields wow jt=tD =
3¹(¹+1)
16+10¹(¹+1)a; which is strictly higher than (C.1)
if ¹ 2 (0;0:47). With regard to Proposition 3, by using (C.4) and (C.1) it can be easily
checked that wft > wa if ¹ 2 (0;0:296):
C.2 Open-shop unions in both countries
When w2 is also the subject of bargaining, we may use (3) to derive the product market
equilibrium expressions taking now into account that w2 ¸ 0. It is then straightforward
to solve for the steady-state Nash equilibrium wages of both ¯rms (w1 = w2 = w). In




(a(1 + ¹) + wi(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ 2wj) i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (C.9)
we have the import threat regime and wages are given by:
wit =
a(1 + ¹2) ¡ 2t(1 ¡ ¹)
5 + ¹2 (C.10)
Substituting either (14) or (C.10) into (C.9) yields
tA =
1 + ¹
2 + ¹2a (C.11)
Under free trade (t = 0), equilibrium wages are given by:
wft =
¹(1 + ¹)
4(2 + ¹(1 + ¹))
a (C.12)
Implications for Propositions 1 and 3
From (C.10) and (C.11) it is clear that Proposition 2 applies as before. Partial di®erenti-





5 + ¹2 < 0
26if ¹ 2 (0;1): Comparing (C.12) and (14), one can easily check that wft > wa if ¹ 2
(0;0:333), and hence Proposition 3 remains qualitatively unaltered.
C.3 The outcome of the wage bargain with a strictly positive competi-
tive wage






a(1 + ¹2) ¡ 2(t + wc)(1 ¡ ¹)
¹(¹ + 2) + 3
(C.14)
wow =
(a + t + wc)(¹ + 1)¹
2¹(¹ + 1) + 8
(C.15)
wtwI =
(4a + wc)(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 3) ¡ t(¹(4¹ ¡ 11) + 15) ¡ ¢
8(¹(2¹ ¡ 1) + 5)
(C.16)
wtwII =
¹(¹ + 1)(2a + 2wc ¡ t)
4(¹(¹ + 1) + 4)
(C.17)
where ¢ ´ [64(a2 + wc2
) ¡ 16a(9t¹ ¡ 5t ¡ 8wc) ¡ t2 (¹(63¹ + 18) + 335) ¡ 16t(9¹ ¡
5)wc]
1
2. Furthermore, with a strictly positive competitive wage, there is an import deter-
rence regime in the transition between the import threat case and one-way trade. This is
given by:
wid = 2(t + wc) ¡ a (C.18)
The locus ¹min
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(2a ¡ 2wc ¡ t)(a ¡ 5t ¡ 2wc) + ¡








2a + 62wc ¡ t








(2wc + t ¡ 2a)(34at ¡ 7a2 ¡ 31t2 + 78awc ¡ 66twc ¡ 71wc2i 1
2. Similarly, we







Proof of Proposition 4
Using (C.19) and (C.23), it can be easily checked that ¹a
min > ¹
ft
min if wc 2 (0; 1
19a):
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